Modern AI systems increasingly operate inside markets and institutions where data, behavior, and incentives are endogenous. This paper develops an economic foundation for multi-agent learning by studying a principal-agent interaction in a Markov decision process with strategic externalities, where both the principal and the agent learn over time. We propose a two-phase incentive mechanism that first estimates implementable transfers and then uses them to steer long-run dynamics; under mild regret-based rationality and exploration conditions, the mechanism achieves sublinear social-welfare regret and thus asymptotically optimal welfare. Simulations illustrate how even coarse incentives can correct inefficient learning under stateful externalities, highlighting the necessity of incentive-aware design for safe and welfare-aligned AI in markets and insurance.

We study online learning for optimal allocation when the resource to be allocated is time. Examples of possible applications include a driver filling a day with rides, a landlord renting an estate, etc. Following our initial motivation, a driver receives ride proposals sequentially according to a Poisson process and can either accept or reject a proposed ride. If she accepts the proposal, she is busy for the duration of the ride and obtains a reward that depends on the ride duration. If she rejects it, she remains on hold until a new ride proposal arrives. We study the regret incurred by the driver first when she knows her reward function but does not know the distribution of the ride duration, and then when she does not know her reward function, either. Faster rates are finally obtained by adding structural assumptions on the distribution of rides or on the reward function. This natural setting bears similarities with contextual (one-armed) bandits, but with the crucial difference that the normalized reward associated to a context depends on the whole distribution of contexts.